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ARTICLE
PRODUCTION LIABILITY
Aditi Bagchi*
It is well known that many consumer goods are produced under dangerous
working conditions. Employers that directly supervise the production of
these goods evade enforcement. Activists and scholars have argued that we
must hold the manufacturers and retailers that purchase goods made in
sweatshops accountable. However, there has been little movement toward
such accountability.
Responsibility for the conditions under which goods are made—what I call
“production liability”—entails assigning responsibility for workers to firms
that do not directly employ them. Production liability, therefore, conflicts
with deep intuitions about the boundaries of individual responsibility.
This Article offers a moral and economic defense of production liability
that is responsive to that challenge. The Article identifies the particular
moral responsibility that manufacturers bear as a public form of complicity.
It further considers the economic logic of assigning legal liability to such
firms and the optimal form that liability should take. This Article makes the
case that production liability can update our legal regime for employment in
the way that products liability did for consumer law.
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INTRODUCTION
Americans are periodically shocked to read about the horrific conditions
under which a variety of retail goods are manufactured, especially our
clothing. But we do not sustain our shock in sufficient numbers to alter those
conditions through reduced consumer demand. Well-known corporations
have taken steps to improve working conditions at their suppliers’ factories,
but these efforts have been mostly ineffectual.1
Factory working conditions in industries like the garment industry are a
well-known and long-standing problem. Our limited progress can be
explained in two obvious ways. First, improving working conditions for
workers comes at someone’s expense. Whether those potential payors are
corporations or consumers, they have more political clout than the workers
whose health and safety are at issue. Second, the enforcement of laws
intended to improve working conditions is costly. The result is that workers’
interests in health and safety compete not just with the interests of those with
a stake in cheap production but with the many other worthy beneficiaries of
government spending. Enforcing employment law rivals a myriad of other
public spending priorities.
These constraints on any solution to the seemingly intractable problem of
poor working conditions are daunting, but they may explain less than they
appear to do. Many legal enforcement regimes advance the interests of one
group at the expense of other, more politically powerful groups. And it is
true of every government spending priority that it comes at the expense of
other budget items. More must be said to explain our lack of progress on the
specific problem of dangerous production.
One important obstacle is conceptual. We have thus far regulated
employment conditions by regulating employers. But the employers of
workers who manufacture many consumer goods, especially clothing, are
almost outside the reach of the law.2 The actors in the supply chain who are
1. See generally RICHARD M. LOCKE, THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF PRIVATE POWER:
PROMOTING LABOR STANDARDS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2013) (describing the difficulties that
Nike faces in attempting to improve supplier working conditions).
2. See infra Part I.
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in the best position to improve working conditions and who are within the
reach of the law are firms that purchase goods from suppliers,3 with only
suppliers directly employing the workers whose safety is at issue. We have
failed to regulate lead firms not only due to a lack of political will, as many
worker advocates have assumed, but also because there is genuine
uncertainty about whether we are justified in assigning legal responsibility
for working conditions to persons with no direct relationship with the
workers. Absent a cogent theory of lead firm responsibility—or what I will
call “production liability”—pinning legal liability on lead firms seems
arbitrary, opportunistic, and perhaps inconsistent with basic principles of
fairness and efficiency in our larger legal system.
This Article aims to provide the moral and economic logic that links lead
firms with their suppliers’ employees. The discussion centers on the garment
industry, though the analysis and conclusions are intended to apply to other
industries with similar market structures. The focus on safety violations does
not directly address the related challenges of unpaid wages and low wages,
but it should generate some insight into those problems, too.
This Article encompasses the matter of working conditions in the factories
of domestic and foreign subcontractors. Although their legal situations are
importantly distinguishable, because domestic and overseas suppliers are, to
a large extent, substitutes for one another, any reform that targets one without
the other is unlikely to be effective.4 One of the advantages of the legal
course that this Article ultimately endorses is that it will not substantially
skew lead firms’ choice of suppliers.
Early on, this Article concludes, as other commentators have, that suppliercontractors are themselves largely ungovernable.5 It is an alarming
conclusion, but it shows the extent to which the problem we are addressing
is not just a humanitarian problem, but a challenge to the rule of law.
Suppliers in the garment industry frustrate the possibility of effective private
recourse, and they are too numerous and short-lived to be subject to effective
government oversight. For this reason, commentators—including this one—
consistently arrive at the conclusion that some kind of liability for lead firms
is necessary to improve working conditions in their suppliers’ factories.
Notwithstanding the widespread view among scholars that working
conditions cannot be effectively regulated without regulating lead firms,
there has been no attempt to systematically study the philosophical and
economic bases for assigning liability to lead firms and, accordingly, no
3. This Article refers to the companies that buy goods from suppliers as “lead firms,”
which include both recognizable brands that retail their wares directly and manufacturers that
distribute their goods through retail intermediaries.
4. Production has shifted overseas but at times it has also shifted back, suggesting that
fluctuating transaction costs can overwhelm any fundamental difference in factory prices. See
Dennis Hayashi, Preventing Human Rights Abuses in the U.S. Garment Industry: A Proposed
Amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 195, 197 (1992) (explaining
that the trend toward foreign production in the garment industry was reversed in the early
1990s due to “uncertain political conditions abroad, increased labor costs, poor workmanship,
and problems associated with moving goods quickly”).
5. See infra Part I.
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satisfactory answer to the question of what form production liability should
take. This Article takes on these open questions.
The concept of production liability is intended to invoke the apparently
quite distinct doctrine of products liability.6 Products liability concerns
manufacturer liability to consumers for defects in products, even where those
products are purchased from third parties.7 The legal concept of privity
initially barred manufacturer liability for product defects because
manufacturers do not stand in any direct relationship with consumers; their
relationship is mediated by distributors and retailers.8 It took a revolution in
tort law to establish that manufacturers owe a duty of care directly to
consumers irrespective of the transactional chain that brings products into
consumer hands.9
The shadow of privity—at least, the underlying legal impulse to require a
direct “relationship” between wrongdoers and victims—has also
substantially impaired the case for manufacturer liability for the working
conditions under which goods are produced. Garment manufacturers do not
usually stand in any direct contractual relationship with the workers who
produce their goods. Most important, they do not employ those workers
directly. Their relationship is mediated by suppliers who employ workers to
produce goods and then sell those goods to manufacturers. Just as the legal
system of accountability for defective products had to update to account for
modern systems of mass production and distribution, so too must our system
of accountability for working conditions. I do not expect that the rules and
regulations by which we establish production liability will track products
liability, nor will their histories run in parallel. Furthermore, I do not
advocate judicial leadership or revision of fundamental common-law
doctrines. Nevertheless, products liability and production liability each
represent a new category of legal responsibility that is responsive to modern
economic institutions and which historic common law and more modest
regulatory tweaks have failed to recognize. Products liability ushered in a
fundamental change in the principles of tort law; outdated intuitions about
the boundaries of responsibility still rooted in an abandoned tort-law regime
may be the greatest hurdle to establishing production liability today.
The discussion in this Article proceeds in several Parts. Part I provides
some background on the problem of supplier working conditions. It also
offers an account of the inadequacy of the present legal regime, which is
intended to parallel earlier frustrations with the requirements of privity and
6. See infra Parts I, IV.A.
7. See Products Liability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
8. Fleming James, Jr., Products Liability, 34 TEX. L. REV. 44, 44 (1955); see also, e.g.,
Abercrombie v. Union Portland Cement Co., 205 P. 1118, 1119 (Idaho 1922) (denying
recovery to plaintiff who had no “contractual relation” with the manufacturer it sued).
9. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1998) (“One
engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a
defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the defect.”);
id. § 1 cmt. c (“The rule stated in this Section applies . . . to manufacturers and other
commercial sellers and distributors . . . .”); see also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 352
(2000); DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW §§ 1.1–.2 (2005).
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fault in the context of products liability. Those frustrations gave way to the
products liability regime that exists today. I will explore the fruits and limits
of the analogy between products liability and production liability throughout
the remainder of the Article.
Part II argues that moral responsibility is properly borne by lead firms
because they have control over supplier working conditions and can foresee
those conditions as consequences of their own contractual terms with the
suppliers. Although their “outcome responsibility” is not exclusive, it is a
sufficient basis for the assignment of legal liability, which after all would not
be exclusive under any proposed regime either.
It is not ultimately compelling to claim that the contracts that lead firms
enter with suppliers are themselves direct wrongs against the suppliers’
workers. However, because those contracts make worker abuse likely, lead
firms are complicit in the moral wrong of hazardous working conditions that
suppliers perpetrate directly. The wrongdoing of lead firms is better
conceived as a public wrong that undermines just institutions rather than as
a private wrong against their supplier’s employees. This last point informs
the legal form that production liability should take.
Part III argues that liability for lead firms is not only morally defensible,
but it is also economically advisable. Such firms are best placed to bear the
risk of poor working conditions. Specifically, they are in the best position to
deter violations and to distribute the costs of ameliorating those risks, and
they are the cheapest point of legal enforcement.
Part IV considers the choice between private and public enforcement. That
is, whether it is better to create private rights of action against lead firms, or
whether it is preferable to place the authority to enforce lead firms’
responsibility solely in the hands of administrative agencies. While fully
cognizant of the many limitations of the regulatory approach, this Article
recommends government enforcement. There are several avenues, however,
by which the prospect of government enforcement will give rise to
complementary private enforcement, even absent private rights of action by
the employees of subcontractors. Part IV also considers the appropriate
standard of liability. The conceptual standard this Article proposes is a
hybrid of strict and fault-based liability. Lead firms should be responsible
for working conditions that fail to meet government standards irrespective of
whether any actual injuries have resulted and without inquiry into the details
of their own conduct, including their contractual terms with suppliers and
their performance of those contracts.
Production liability has been a timely topic for a long time. That is, though
the policy concerns that it targets have long been on select political and
scholarly agendas, scattershot litigation and legislative efforts have failed to
make significant headway. There are, of course, substantial economic
interests with political clout that would stand to lose from the implementation
of production liability, and this Article does not take full account of those
headwinds.
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This Article’s primary aim is not to explore the political prospects for
production liability; rather, it will explain its regulatory logic. Nevertheless,
political constraints figure into the analysis at two levels. First, like any
meaningful discussion of potential reform, the foregoing discussion is
cognizant of institutional constraints. This Article takes into account the
costs and probable efficacy of different measures, were they to be adopted.
For example, it presumes that any administrative agency charged with
enforcement of a relevant rule will be underfunded. Second, and more
fundamentally, the prospects for production liability turn at least in part on
the intelligibility of any proposed model, including its moral and economic
underpinnings and its fit with existing legal concepts and institutions. This
Article aims to offer an account of production liability that coheres with our
prevailing normative commitments in that way.
I. SUPPLY CHAINS AND WORKING CONDITIONS
What exactly is the problem? Sweatshops, in a word. Sweatshops are
small factories that produce goods (again, this Article focuses on garments)
that are in turn sold to a lead firm.10 The lead firm either retails the goods
directly or sells them through a distributor, such as a department store.11 The
lead firm has a recognizable brand name, but there are about twenty small
suppliers for every manufacturer (in some cases, thousands more), and no
one has heard of the suppliers.12
There is nothing inherently objectionable about such a market structure;
the lead firms are not so few as to raise immediate concerns about their
market power. However, suppliers are undercapitalized and operating on the
tightest margins, in substantial part due to the fierce competition among
them. They essentially sell labor, and there is little room to creatively
improve productivity relative to competitors.13 They are said to “sweat” out
a profit from their workers, who are paid little and sometimes go unpaid.14
Most of their employees are unskilled and are provided little training, so there
are few costs associated with high turnover in an abundant labor pool. Many
domestic garment workers are non-English speaking or undocumented;15
their reluctance to seek clarification of instructions exacerbates workplace
risks;16 and their reluctance to report unsafe conditions to public authorities
compromises enforcement that is already shoddy.17 The result is that more
10. See Kishanthi Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH. L. REV. 747,
756–57 (2014) (describing the fragmentation of the supply chain); see also Shirley Lung,
Exploiting the Joint Employer Doctrine: Providing a Break for Sweatshop Garment Workers,
34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 291, 302 (2003).
11. See Parella, supra note 10, at 756–57.
12. See id.; see also Lung, supra note 10, at 302.
13. Hayashi, supra note 4, at 204.
14. Andrew Herman, Reassessing the Role of Supplier Codes of Conduct: Closing the
Gap Between Aspirations and Reality, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 445, 471 (2012).
15. Jayesh M. Rathod, Danger and Dignity: Immigrant Day Laborers and Occupational
Risk, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 813, 823–24 (2016).
16. Id.
17. See id. at 824.
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than half of the garment factories in the United States violate labor laws.18
These workplaces are shockingly unsafe, from their production practices to
the physical integrity of the buildings in which they operate.19 These facts
hold with respect to both domestic contractors and overseas contractors.
Neither workers nor agencies that sue domestic contractors consistently
recover damages or fines because contractors are often judgment-proof or
declare bankruptcy.20 Workers are unable to collect from subsequent
businesses that the contractor might open under a different name.21
Although the relative shares of domestic and foreign production shift over
time, the domestic share of production has fallen considerably in the last two
decades. Factory jobs in Los Angeles, where the domestic garment industry
was centered, have decreased by nearly two-thirds in the last decade.22 There
also used to be as many as 30,000 garment workers in New York City in the
1980s and 1990s, but only a few thousand remain today.23 Across the United
States, the number of persons employed in the apparel-manufacturing
industry has dropped by almost four-fifths since 1990.24
Over the last two decades, the Asia Pacific region has become the
dominant source of garments, textiles, and footwear. In 2014, it exported
almost 60 percent of such goods, mostly from China.25 This shift was in part
propelled by the lapse of the Multifiber Agreement, an international trade
agreement that set quotas for the amount of textiles and garments that
developing countries could deliver to developed countries.26 China has also
improved its trade position via the adopted 2001 World Trade Organization
China accession agreement.27 But most obviously, the vast wage differences
between developed and developing countries explain the shift in production,

18. Lung, supra note 10, at 293, 296–98 (describing the scope of the unpaid-wages
problem among contractors in the United States).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 305.
21. Id.
22. Joel Kotkin & Michael Shires, The Cities Leading a U.S. Manufacturing Revival, NEW
GEOGRAPHY (July 24, 2015), http://www.newgeography.com/content/005003-the-citiesleading-a-us-manufacturing-revival [https://perma.cc/8PVV-SLEA].
23. Ke Xu, Union Urges Garment Workers to Purchase ‘Obamacare,’ VOICES N.Y. (Dec.
19,
2013),
https://voicesofny.org/2013/12/union-urges-garment-workers-to-purchaseobamacare/ [https://perma.cc/7T4T-EJ4H].
24. All Employees, Thousands, Apparel, Seasonally Adjusted, BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/CES3231500001?amp%253bdata_tool=XGtable&output_vie
w=data&include_graphs=true [https://perma.cc/F4T6-W9PC] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
25. INT’L LABOUR ORG., WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE GARMENT SECTOR IN ASIA AND
THE PACIFIC AND THE ARAB STATES 1 (2016), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--asia/---ro-bangkok/documents/publication/wcms_534289.pdf [https://perma.cc/wm9h-ha4z].
26. See Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles: General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Dec. 20, 1973, 25 U.S.T. 1001.
27. World Trade Organization, Decision of 10 November 2001, Protocol on the Accession
of the People’s Republic of China, WTO Doc. WT/L/432 (2001); see also Jordan Weissmann,
Waking the Sleeping Dragon, SLATE (Sept. 28, 2016, 12:00 PM), https://slate.com/
business/2016/09/when-china-joined-the-wto-it-kick-started-the-chinese-economy-androused-a-giant.html [https://perma.cc/RX34-3TT3].
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with labor costs in South and Southeast Asia sometimes equaling just
6 percent of labor costs in the United States.28
Workers at overseas suppliers may be formally entitled to sue their
employers, too, but their home legal systems are often ill-equipped to handle
such cases. Working conditions at supplier factories may not be very
different from other local workplaces. Given the importance of attracting
foreign income, enforcing local employment protections against suppliers is
often not a priority. The sheer number of suppliers, here and abroad, makes
government enforcement a formidable task in any event.29 The result is that
overseas suppliers, like their American counterparts, operate in violation of
local worker safety ordinances with impunity.
Workplace safety is traditionally the responsibility of employers. Even if
suppliers are difficult to regulate as employers, why look to lead firms, in
particular, as an alternative? This Article analyzes the moral and economic
basis for their liability in depth in subsequent Parts. But the push for
production liability is mysterious without understanding the inadequacy of
the present legal regime and the potential that lies in lead firms.
The appeal of lead firms as a point of enforcement is easily stated. Lead
firms have substantial bargaining power vis-à-vis suppliers.30 They are in a
position to demand alterations to the workplace.31 On the other hand, they
are also in a position to exact contract terms that make it impossible for
suppliers to comply with safety regulations while remaining profitable.32
Indeed, labor abuses are more common during the peak seasons of the
clothing industry because of the tight schedule to which suppliers are subject
at those times.33
In specific cases, lead firms that were subjected to intense, negative
publicity after a tragedy or investigation at a supplier location have taken
measures to substantially improve working conditions at their suppliers.34
However, these measures have never been adopted on an industry-wide scale.
28. DAMIAN GRIMSHAW & RAFAEL MUÑOZ DE BUSTILLO, GLOBAL COMPARATIVE STUDY
ON WAGE FIXING INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR IMPACTS IN MAJOR GARMENT PRODUCING
COUNTRIES 54 (2016), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/

documents/publication/wcms_558636.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7DE-FZSG].
29. See Timothy P. Glynn, Taking the Employer Out of Employment Law? Accountability
for Wage and Hour Violations in an Age of Enterprise Disaggregation, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL’Y J. 201, 204 (2011).
30. Most contractors in the garment industry have limited bargaining power because they
lack business experience, education, language skills, and capital. See Hayashi, supra note 4,
at 200.
31. See id.
32. See Glynn, supra note 29, at 214 & n.59; see also Scott L. Cummings, Hemmed In:
Legal Mobilization in the Los Angeles Anti-Sweatshop Movement, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 1, 15–16, 43–44 (2009).
33. See Sean Cooney, A Broader Role for the Commonwealth in Eradicating Foreign
Sweatshops?, 28 MELB. U. L. REV. 290, 296 n.22 (2004).
34. See, e.g., Larry Cata Backer, Transnational Corporations’ Outward Expression of
Inward Self-Constitution: The Enforcement of Human Rights by Apple, Inc., 20 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 805, 836–47 (2013) (describing the pressure on Apple and the
subsequent monitoring efforts it has undertaken); Douglass Cassel, Corporate Initiatives: A
Second Human Rights Revolution?, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1963, 1969 (1996) (describing the
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Labor rights activists and employment scholars have pursued four main
avenues to hold lead firms accountable: (1) direct claims by workers against
lead firms, (2) regulations that outlaw goods produced under wrongful
conditions, (3) consumer misrepresentation claims, and (4) voluntary
corporate codes.
First, proponents of production liability have argued that lead firms are
“employers,” that they owe direct duties of care to contractors’ employees,
or both. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),35 which applies only to
domestic employees, defines “employment” broadly in what the Act’s
legislative history suggests may have been a deliberate effort to encompass
manufacturers.36 But courts have only rarely held lead firms accountable
under the Act.
In Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb,37 the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the determination of a person’s status as an employee turns on “the
circumstances of the whole activity,” which seemed to invite varied criteria
across jurisdictions.38 Some courts use a definition heavily influenced by
common-law control criteria.39 Lead firms’ lack of direct physical control
over suppliers’ workers is usually enough to avoid liability under that
standard.40 Other courts emphasize “economic reality” and ask whether
work performed by the ostensible employee is part of an “integrated
economic unit.” Courts sometimes question whether the intermediate
contractor had an opportunity to bargain with the proposed employermanufacturer. Some courts applying this standard also ask which party
dominated decision-making over essential determinants of profits in a
business.41 This approach is more hospitable to U.S. workers who want to
sue a lead firm,42 but “[c]ourts decide rather arbitrarily which factors to

measures taken by Gap in response to negative publicity surrounding supplier working
conditions in El Salvador); see also Harry Arthurs, Corporate Self-Regulation: Political
Economy, State Regulation and Reflexive Labour Law, in REGULATING LABOUR IN THE WAKE
OF GLOBALISATION 19, 20–24 (Brian Bercusson & Cynthia Estlund eds., 2008).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 203 (2012).
36. See Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern American
Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983,
1003–05 (1999).
37. 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
38. Id. at 730.
39. See, e.g., Wilde v. County of Kandiyohi, 15 F.3d 103, 105 (8th Cir. 1994); Wheeler
v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 268–75 (10th Cir. 1987).
40. See, e.g., Xue Zhen Zhao v. Bebe Stores, Inc., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1155 (C.D. Cal.
2003). In Xue Zhen Zhao, a California district court found that a manufacturer was not a joint
employer. The supplier in that case performed work for multiple manufacturers, owned the
factory and equipment that workers used, employed its own supervisors, and controlled
workers’ pay and hours. Id. at 1155–56.
41. See, e.g., Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 639–42 (9th Cir. 1997); Real v. Driscoll
Strawberry Assocs., 603 F.2d 748, 754–55 (9th Cir. 1979).
42. See Lopez v. Silverman, 14 F. Supp. 2d 405, 419–21 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (considering a
range of factors to find garment workers economically dependent and to extend employer
liability to a manufacturer).
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employ and, without articulated interpretive frameworks to guide their
decisions, courts oscillate between different versions of the factors.”43
There have been a few successes in the effort to hold lead firms
accountable as employers under the FLSA. Most notably, in Ling Nan Zheng
v. Liberty Apparel Co.,44 the Second Circuit upheld a jury’s finding that a
New York garment manufacturer was the plaintiffs’ joint employer.45 The
court considered several factors:
(1) whether workers used the
manufacturer’s premises and equipment; (2) whether the contractor had a
business that could or did shift as a unit from one putative joint employer to
another; (3) the extent to which workers performed a discrete line job that
was integral to the manufacturer’s process of production; (4) whether
responsibility under the contracts could pass from one contractor to another
without material changes; (5) who supervised the workers; and (6) whether
workers worked exclusively or predominantly for the manufacturer.46 Ling
Nan Zheng demonstrates that production liability may be doctrinally
attainable by way of the FLSA.47 However, its test has proven to be a high
hurdle for plaintiffs and there has been no shift in the direction of treating
lead firms as joint employers of their suppliers’ workers. While recent cases
suggest that courts may be wary of corporations’ efforts to classify workers
as independent contractors to avoid employer responsibilities,48 there is no
indication that courts will designate workers as employees of a firm when
those workers are already clearly employees of a different firm.
Even if it were possible to hold lead firms accountable for conditions of
domestic production under the FLSA, overseas workers cannot sue under the
Act.49 Those workers also cannot rely on any amorphous common-law duty
of care that the FLSA might be regarded as codifying with respect to some
subset of workers. In one notable suit, overseas workers sued Wal-Mart,
arguing that it had breached a duty of care owed to them by failing to
adequately monitor its suppliers’ working conditions.50 The court said that
the existence of any duty of care was a policy question and declined to

43. See Lung, supra note 10, at 325.
44. 389 F. App’x 63 (2d Cir. 2010). A district court in New York in an earlier case had
found “genuine issues of material fact as to whether and to what degree [the defendant
manufacturer] supervised [the contractor’s employees’] work.” Fen X. Chen v. St. Beat
Sportswear, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 2d 269, 288 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
45. Ling Nan Zheng, 389 F. App’x at 66.
46. See generally id.
47. See generally id.
48. See generally O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015);
Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018).
49. Section 213(f) of the FLSA specifically states that it will “not apply with respect to
any employee whose services during the workweek are performed in a workplace within a
foreign country.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(f) (2012).
50. Aaron J. Schindel & Jeremy Mittman, Workers Abroad, Trouble at Home:
Multinational Employers Face Growing Liability for Labor Violations of Overseas Suppliers,
19 NYSBA INT’L L. PRACTICUM 40, 40 (2006). See generally Class Action Complaint for
Injunctive Relief and Damages, Jane Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., No. BC339737 (Cal.
Super. Ct. filed Sept. 13, 2005).
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recognize any such duty running from lead firms to suppliers’ workers.51 It
dismissed the suit,52 and the prospects for any subsequent claims by overseas
workers against U.S. lead firms appear dim.
Overseas employees of suppliers are also unable to bring suit against lead
firms under other statutes that do not depend on designating lead firms as
employers or establishing a direct relationship between lead firms and
employees. Overseas workers cannot bring suit under the Alien Tort Statute
(ATS)53 unless they allege a violation of a norm that was specific, universal,
and obligatory as of 1789, when the law was enacted.54 The Court expressed
great reluctance to recognize any new private claims.55 Most unsafe working
conditions—let alone contracting with the direct operator of a facility with
such conditions—probably would not amount to a violation of long-standing
Nor is the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
international law.56
Organizations (RICO) Act57 a promising avenue of recourse for overseas
workers. Although one district court found that a contractual relationship
between a retailer and supplier can provide sufficient facts to state a RICO
claim, the court ultimately dismissed the RICO claim at hand, finding that
the allegations did not establish that the defendant retail brands participated
in the alleged enterprise.58 In 2016, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit
split and allowed some extraterritorial application of RICO, but only where
the predicate conduct is itself a violation of a statute with extraterritorial
application.59
Direct liability to workers has had little legal traction notwithstanding a
significant grassroots movement to hold lead firms accountable. It is their
work that is the impetus for taking seriously the problem of sweatshop
workers.60 Organizations like the Institute for Global Labour and Human
51. Jane Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CV 05-7307 AG (MANx), 2007 WL
5975664, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2007) (explaining that the “duty Plaintiffs seek to enforce
would be a duty of a retailer to be reasonably careful when contracting with suppliers to
prevent intentional labor violations by those suppliers” but rejecting this view because
“Plaintiffs’ negligence claims go well beyond the recognized limits of liability”), aff’d, 572
F.3d 685 (9th Cir. 2009).
52. Id. at *7–8.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
54. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–33 (2004).
55. Id.
56. See id. at 712–13 (limiting ATS private rights of action to claims that are universally
recognized as arising out of the law of nations); Melissa Torres, Labor Rights and the ATCA:
Can the ILO’s Fundamental Rights Be Supported Through ATCA Litigation?, 37 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 447, 464–67 (2004) (noting that the ATS does not enable enforcement of all
fundamental labor rights because those right are not considered a part of customary
international law).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2012).
58. Doe I v. Gap, Inc., No. CV-01-0031, 2001 WL 1842389, at *8 (D. N. Mar. I. Nov. 26,
2001) (“As noted above, the allegations adequately show an opportunity for the retailer
defendants to participate in the enterprise. However, for the reasons given below, the
allegations purportedly showing that the retailer defendants actually did participate in the
enterprise are insufficient to constitute . . . ‘participation’ [under the RICO Act].”).
59. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2104 (2016).
60. Cummings, supra note 32, at 18–19, 43–44 (describing several grassroots campaigns);
Andrew Elmore, Comment, State Joint Employer Liability Laws and Pro Se Back Wage
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Rights and the Worker Rights Consortium monitor factories, conduct
research, and attempt to garner public support to pressure brands to fix
problems in specific factories.61 Nevertheless, the specific aim of holding
lead firms directly responsible to supplier employees has made little legal
progress. Even if the case law were gradually to turn toward a finding of
control by lead firms, companies are as likely to distance themselves from
suppliers as they are to improve working conditions throughout their supply
chain.62
A second strategy for worker advocates has been public regulation. The
so-called “hot goods” provision of the FLSA allows the government to seize
any goods that were manufactured in violation of labor laws.63 The Obama
administration used this provision more rigorously than previous
administrations.64 There also have been several local, regional, and sectorspecific efforts to use the provision to enforce labor standards.65 In principle,
authority to seize hot goods would operate as a strict liability regulation in
that it does not depend on establishing the present owner’s fault for the
conditions under which goods were produced. It thus avoids the high costs
that worker representatives face when attempting to establish lead-firm
control over particular supplier factories. However, the hot goods provision
is more limited than it appears at first blush. It exempts both common carriers
and “good faith purchasers” of goods who were unaware of the illegal
conditions of production.66 A 2014 fact sheet from the Department of Labor
further clarified that goods on retailers’ shelves or in consumer hands are not
illegal because they are no longer in the flow of commerce.67 No doubt, even
within these legal parameters, there are many hot goods that could be seized
but are not simply because enforcement officers are woefully underfunded

Claims in the Garment Industry: A Federalist Approach to a National Crisis, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 395, 399 (2001) (describing various efforts to combat labor violations domestically,
including ones that would impose liability on manufacturers and retailers).
61. See generally Mark Anner, Jennifer Bair & Jeremy Blasi, Toward Joint Liability in
Global Supply Chains: Addressing the Root Causes of Labor Violations in International
Subcontracting Networks, 35 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 1 (2013); Cummings, supra note 32.
62. Aaron Grieser, Comment, Defining the Outer Limits of Global Compliance Programs:
Emerging Legal & Reputational Liability in Corporate Supply Chains, 10 OR. REV. INT’L L.
285, 319–20 (2008).
63. 29 U.S.C. § 211(a) (2012).
64. DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY
AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 215–16, 227–28 (2014).
65. See, e.g., Lora Jo Foo, The Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant Workforce and the
Need for Strengthening Worker Protective Legislation, 103 YALE L.J. 2179, 2193 (1994);
Stephanie A. Koltookian, Note, Some (Don’t) Like It Hot: The Use of the “Hot Goods”
Injunction in Perishable Agriculture, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1841, 1847–58 (2015); see also David
Weil, Crafting a Progressive Workplace Regulatory Policy: Why Enforcement Matters, 28
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 125, 141–42 (2007) (advocating for more widespread use of the hot
goods provision).
66. Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 1, 30 (2010).
67. WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET #80: THE PROHIBITION
AGAINST SHIPMENT OF “HOT GOODS” UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (2014).
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and have other priorities. The combined result is that public regulation has
not been an effective substitute for private enforcement of worker rights.
A third strategy has been to hold lead firms accountable to consumers. In
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky,68 a consumer sued Nike on the grounds that it misled
buyers about the conditions under which its goods were produced.69 Nike
claimed that its representations were protected by the First Amendment.70
The case was settled before being adjudicated, but the California Supreme
Court did reverse the trial court’s dismissal on the grounds that Nike was
only entitled to the lesser First Amendment protections granted commercial
speech.71 Lawyers are sufficiently skeptical about consumers’ legal
arguments that this strategy has not been pursued systematically.
Consumer movements also have sought to exert market pressure on lead
firms, and these campaigns have been more successful in discrete cases.
However, perhaps because labor abuses are so widespread, there has never
been a consumer movement of a magnitude sufficient to trigger any
substantial changes in industry practices at the ground level. The problem is
not really that consumers are unaware of dangerous working conditions so
much as the sheer pervasiveness of those conditions raises the cost of
deliberately avoiding such goods beyond the price many consumers are
apparently willing to pay.72
The most important changes that consumer movements have won pertain
to the formal commitments of lead firms. In the fourth and final strategy for
lead firm accountability, consumer and worker advocacy groups have pushed
lead firms to adopt codes of conduct for suppliers.73 Some codes are quasicontractual and are inspired by the “jobbers agreements” of the mid-twentieth
century.74 Those contracts among workers, contractors, and lead firms fixed
labor prices in the domestic apparel supply chain.75 The agreements were
initially imposed by a “fair code” under the National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA), but they were sustained by collective action of the International
Ladies Garment Workers Union after the NIRA was struck down as

68. 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (per curiam).
69. Id. at 656.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 657.
72. See Allison M. Snyder, Note, Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable: Is
Non-Financial Disclosure the Answer?, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 565, 599–606 (observing
limitations of voluntary disclosure of corporate practices); cf. Robert Dorfman, The Economics
of Products Liability: A Reaction to McKean, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 92, 98 (1970) (“[T]he
problem of products liability arises because we live in a world in which it is costly to obtain
full, or even adequate, information about the products we use.”). Although it is difficult to
obtain information about the conditions under which any particular good is made, the
ubiquitous phenomenon of dangerous working conditions is not costly to learn.
73. See Grieser, supra note 62, at 291–92; Sarah Rackoff, Note, Room Enough for the DoGooders: Corporate Social Accountability and the Sherman Act, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1037,
1043–47 (2007).
74. See generally Anner, Bair & Blasi, supra note 61.
75. Id.
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unconstitutional.76 However, these agreements fell apart when contractors
moved to nonunion states.77 Worker advocates today recommend the
adoption of international or global framework agreements (GFAs) between
international union federations and multinational companies or global brands
to achieve similar private regulation of working conditions.78
Over 100 GFAs have been signed.79 The vast majority of GFAs are
between a global union federation and a transnational corporation based in
Western Europe.80 The most dominant global union in the GFA context is
the IndustriALL Global Union, followed by UNI Global Union.81 While
earlier GFAs did not even reference supply chains, now most include some
reference to them, though enforcement language varies considerably.82 In
fact, with a few exceptions, GFAs typically have few substantive terms.83
The agreements have been successful where competing unions came together
to pressure a corporation; ongoing union pressure has been critical, rather
than any roadmap for enforcement contained within the GFA itself.84 Absent
union monitoring, GFAs are poorly enforced.85
Most corporate codes are adopted unilaterally, albeit under some pressure
from one or more nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In these codes,
the corporation undertakes to ensure that all of its suppliers abide by some
standards without assuming any other directed obligation to do so.86
Although companies do expend substantial resources monitoring suppliers
under these agreements, they have not effected any industry-wide change in
practice.87 Organizations like the Maquila Solidarity Network, a Canadian
76. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (striking
down the NIRA).
77. See Anner, Bair & Blasi, supra note 61, at 20.
78. See Felix Hadwiger, Global Framework Agreements: Achieving Decent Work in
Global Supply Chains?, 7 INT’L J. LAB. RES. 75, 77 (2015).
79. Michael Fichter & Jamie K. McCallum, Implementing Global Framework
Agreements: The Limits of Social Partnership, 15 GLOBAL NETWORKS S65, S66 (2015).
80. Hadwiger, supra note 78, at 21.
81. Id. at 15.
82. See Jan M. Smits, Enforcing Corporate Social Responsibility Codes Under Private
Law: On the Disciplining Power of Legal Doctrine, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 99, 111
(2017); Haley Revak, Note, Corporate Codes of Conduct: Binding Contract or Ideal
Publicity?, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1645, 1657 (2012).
83. Hadwiger, supra note 78, at 25.
84. See Fichter & McCallum, supra note 79, at S66.
85. See id.; see also Hadwiger, supra note 78, at 6. Note that code provisions that concern
the employees of suppliers tend to be less committal, and therefore less binding, than
statements about a company’s own employment practices. See generally James J. Brudney,
Envisioning Enforcement of Freedom of Association Standards in Corporate Codes: A
Journey for Sinbad or Sisyphus?, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 555 (2012) (observing that
codes of conduct are inadequately enforced at present, but offering some legal strategies for
increasing compliance).
86. See generally Jaakko Salminen, The Accord on Fire and Building Safety in
Bangladesh: A New Paradigm for Limiting Buyers’ Liability in Global Supply Chains?, 66
AM. J. COMP. L. 411 (2018).
87. See Renée-Claude Drouin, Promoting Fundamental Labor Rights Through
International Framework Agreements: Practice Outcomes and Present Challenges, 31 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 591, 592 (2010) (describing the limited success of voluntary labor codes).
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anti-sweatshop network, urge brands to follow through on their stated
policies, but their leverage depends on fickle public attention.88 After all,
corporations gain little for each dollar they spend monitoring their suppliers;
they only attenuate the risk of a public relations catastrophe in the event of a
high-profile, large-scale accident at a factory that makes their wares. Most
of the injuries resulting at dangerous workplaces are small-scale and do not
pose a substantial threat to brand image. Nevertheless, because litigation
largely has failed as a method of ensuring accountability, most organizations
now rely on brand protection as the impetus for socially responsible
production.89
The first and third strategies described above, which attempt to create
direct liability for supplier working conditions to workers or consumers, have
been almost entirely without success. The second and fourth strategies,
involving narrow regulatory initiatives or corporate codes, have achieved
modest results but are inevitably limited in how far they can go.
One might boil down the present legal hurdles to production liability as
the absence of any direct relationship between a contractor’s employees and
lead firms and the difficulty in showing that any specific wrongful action by
a lead firm resulted in worker injury. Suppliers sit between their employees
and lead firms contractually. And any responsibility by lead firms must rest
on a theory about what they might have done rather than the identification of
affirmative actions that they took.
These two obstacles to liability are familiar from the path to products
liability. In that context, courts gradually relaxed the privity requirement
between manufacturers and consumers and more abruptly abandoned the
fault requirement to impose strict liability.90 As we now observe with
production liability, the pressure on privity in the products liability context
came first and followed consumer market developments.91 Consumers came
to make purchasing decisions with almost exclusive attention to the
reputation of the brand manufacturer, with little regard for the intermediate
retailer. In the case of production liability, consumers’ attention to brand
manufacturers has left the original producer in the shadows. Where the
retailer stood between consumer and manufacturer, the supplier now stands
between worker and manufacturer.
Production liability, the proposed name for such liability, is obviously
intended to invoke the inverse of products liability. Just as products liability
refers to the liability of a manufacturer to a consumer who may purchase
from a third-party intermediary (distributor or retailer), production liability
88. See Anner, Bair & Blasi, supra note 61, at 35.
89. Activists in Los Angeles took the lead in pursuing litigation against lead firms, but by
now they too have shifted to collaboration with manufacturers. See Cummings, supra note 32,
at 68–70.
90. See Lung, supra note 10, at 339–40.
91. The decline of privity in the products liability context followed an earlier market
rupture whereby “the consumer’s loyalty and reliance [moved] from his retailer and
attached . . . to the producer. . . . [T]he decline of the doctrine of privity is the legal recognition
of this transformation.” Dorfman, supra note 72, at 100.
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makes brands liable to employees notwithstanding a third-party intermediary
(suppliers and employers).
II. THE MORAL BASIS OF PRODUCTION LIABILITY
The central proposition of this Article, and of this Part, is that lead firms
are morally responsible for unsafe working conditions at their suppliers, even
though suppliers directly employ the workers. Those who do not believe that
moral responsibility is a necessary, if insufficient, condition for legal liability
will be unconcerned with the proposition this Article defends. That is, to the
extent one believes that the question of moral responsibility for an injury only
applies where one person is held directly legally accountable to another for
injury—as in ordinary tort liability—production liability requires no moral
justification. But though private rights of action that invoke the machinery
of private adjudication may require a distinct species of justification, we do
not normally hold persons—including companies—liable even in regulatory
form for actions or circumstances for which they are not responsible in any
familiar sense. For example, we do not assign liability for cleaning up
environmental disasters based on liquidity or expertise—we ask who is
responsible for the environmental damage in question. While a system that
did not hinge legal liability on moral responsibility might not be illegitimate,
our practice is for liability to track responsibility, and it is a good practice. It
avoids arbitrariness that might arise were that practice to be abandoned. This
Part considers whether production liability is consistent with this practice.
Assuming, then, that moral responsibility should be regarded a prerequisite
for production liability, one might have two primary reservations concerning
the conditions of moral responsibility. First, we normally think that we have
to make a difference to an outcome to be responsible for it. Given the
prevalence of poor working conditions in an industry or a foreign labor
market, it is uncertain whether the conditions under which any given worker
labors will be improved by the terms of a supply contract. Altering the terms
of supply contracts could merely divert business to another lead firm or to
another local industry. Thus, opponents of production liability will argue
that lead firms make no difference to the conditions under which any
particular person labors.
Second, we normally think that we are not responsible for the actions of
others. Suppliers are moral agents that make their own choices, and it is those
choices that translate the terms of their contracts with lead firms into poor
working conditions for their employees. Thus, opponents of production
liability can argue that the link that stands between lead firms and workers
on the supply chain (i.e., suppliers) effectively insulates lead firms from
moral responsibility.
This Article aims to overcome these intuitions and to show that production
liability is morally defensible. The aim is not to show either that legal
liability of lead firms is morally compulsory or that lead firms are morally
blameworthy; rather, the goal is to establish that lead firms are morally
responsible for the dangerous working conditions under which their goods
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are produced. This Part proceeds first by elaborating on the relevant notion
of responsibility, distinguishing it from culpability. It then argues that
contracting with suppliers generates a particular kind of responsibility for
working conditions (i.e., complicity). Finally, this Part argues that the type
of complicity at issue represents a public wrong rather than a direct, private
wrong against the particular workers who manufacture a firms’ goods under
dangerous conditions. The economic analysis of optimal liability is largely
reserved for Part III, while Part IV considers specific forms of legal liability.
A. Outcome Responsibility
The concept of responsibility invoked here tracks the notion of “outcome
responsibility” developed in tort theory over the last several decades.
Scholars such as Tony Honoré, Stephen Perry, and John Gardner have
persuasively argued that responsibility to other private individuals is not
properly predicated on culpability, but on a lesser form of responsibility.92
This responsibility extends beyond the intended effects of our actions to the
foreseeable consequences of our action or inaction—matters under our
control. Importantly, this account of responsibility was not engineered to
account for lead firm responsibility in production. It is a fundamental
account of responsibility more generally, which means that, to the extent that
it applies to lead firms, holding them responsible would be consistent with
how we deploy the moral and legal concepts of responsibility more broadly.
Foreseeability and control are not usually regarded as sufficient to generate
blameworthiness. That is because individuals may not intend and may
actually disavow certain effects of their actions. Negligent actions, for
example, do not rise to the level of culpability where the negligent person
never contemplates that someone may be hurt by her actions.93 Nevertheless,
a negligent person is responsible for the injuries that flow from her
negligence. To hold otherwise would deny the scope of her agency; it would
make her action and its consequences normatively indistinguishable from an

92. See John Gardner, Obligations and Outcomes in the Law of Torts, in RELATING TO
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS FOR TONY HONORÉ ON HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 111, 136 (Peter
Cane & John Gardner eds., 2001) (“To deny that success can have independent rational
significance is to leave us without any story of our lives as practical reasoners.”); Tony
Honoré, Responsibility and Luck, 104 LAW Q. REV. 530, 543 (1988) (“If actions and outcomes
were not ascribed to us on the basis of our bodily movements and their mental
accompaniments, we could have no continuing history or character.”); Stephen R. Perry, The
Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 505–07 (1992) [hereinafter Perry, The
Moral Foundations of Tort Law] (arguing that agency is a “meaningful notion” because one
can imagine an agent with knowledge of all relevant causal regularities who is capable of
controlling natural processes, and observing outcome responsibility involves “retrospective
evaluation of action” that turns on what would have been foreseeable to such an idealized
agent); Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in
PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 72, 83 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001) (“[O]utcomeresponsibility in the achievement sense comprises a fundamental element in our understanding
of our own agency.”).
93. See generally Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, supra note 92.
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event in the world without agency at its root.94 For example, it would equate
hitting someone with the car you are driving too fast to hitting someone after
your car has been hit by the car behind you. Failing to distinguish an event
in which a person is merely involved from the actions she undertakes would
undermine her very status as an agent capable of effecting change in the
world.
The price of one’s status as an agent capable of effecting such change is
ownership of those effects. Because it is central to our identity that we are
agents who can act upon the world, it is important that we credit each other
with responsibility for the way we move things around us, even where those
interactions with the world outside ourselves go wrong. If we do not accept
responsibility for what we do, we constrict our agency. Instead of defining
the boundary between ourselves and the rest of the world, agency would turn
on some inaccessible and uncertain internal boundary between fully formed
intentions and the broader haze through which much action takes place. A
shared concept of outcome responsibility makes the all-important line the one
between persons and objects outside ourselves. Our shared reliance on the
concept helps construct us as agents.
However central outcome responsibility may be to individuals, the concept
does not obviously extend to corporations.95 Certainly, we are not invested
in constructing corporations as moral agents for the same reasons. But, as
with natural persons, how we treat corporations is a matter of social
construction and not a metaphysical inquiry.96 It will turn on what we mean
when we say that a corporation is responsible for a loss or state of affairs.
Our legal practice largely has assumed that corporations can be morally
responsible because they perform actions that can be attributed only to the
corporation, as opposed to its members, and they perform those actions with
intentions that can similarly only be attributed to the corporation itself.97
Christian List and Philip Pettit have argued that groups like corporations may

94. See THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 37–38 (1979); see also Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Two Dimensions of Responsibility in Crime, Tort, and Moral Luck, 9 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 97, 98 (2008).
95. To the extent one believes that corporations can be assigned legal responsibilities,
even absent the conditions of moral responsibility, this Part’s argument is not that this is a
problem, but that such responsibility is merely unnecessary.
96. See Rebecca DeWinter, The Anti-Sweatshop Movement: Constructing Corporate
Moral Agency in the Global Apparel Industry, 15 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 99, 99–101, 108–14
(2001) (describing the social construction of corporate moral agency).
97. Some scholars have attempted to express and to defend these assumptions. See
generally, e.g., Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207
(1979). But see Manuel G. Velasquez, Why Corporations Are Not Morally Responsible for
Anything They Do, in COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY: FIVE DECADES OF DEBATE IN
THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ETHICS 111, 120 (Larry May & Stacey Hoffman eds., 1991) (“The
underlying reason for corporate policies and procedures being unable to generate intentional
action is that the concept of intentional action . . . is rooted in the concept of an agent with a
certain mental and bodily unity that corporations do not have.”).
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qualify as moral agents because they “have representational states,
motivational states, and a capacity to process them and act on that basis.”98
Of course, the possibility of corporate moral responsibility remains in
controversy, and the debate is beyond the scope of this Article.99 Another
pragmatic, but also principled, reason for extending the basic framework of
responsibility to corporations does not depend on assigning corporations
“real” moral responsibility; instead, it hinges on the value of applying a
consistent framework of legal concepts to all legal persons. So long as
corporations are treated as persons and subject to the same principles and
protections of private law, the burden is on those who wish to apply a
different standard of responsibility to corporations in a particular context. As
it stands, the idea of corporate responsibility would not be unique to
production liability. Corporations are held liable for their actions throughout
our legal system and without controversy, at least outside criminal law.
Indeed, it is hard to imagine a world in which they are not responsible and in
which all fines are assigned instead to individuals within the firm. The effect
would be to undo the corporation as an entity, since it is designed precisely
to shield individuals from such liability.100
Applying the ordinary standard of responsibility—foreseeability and
control—to lead firms, we can conclude that a retailer is responsible for the
accidents, working conditions, or employment terms under which its goods
are produced if those consequences of its supplier contracts are foreseeable
and could be avoided by different contractual terms. Neither foreseeability
nor control is inevitable for brands, as they usually are for direct employers.
But legal responsibility can reflect contingent facts about the global supply
chain, the flow of information to retailers from sites of production, and the
permitted communication between brands. Together, these facts make it both
predictable to brands that certain payment structures and production
timelines worsen employment conditions at the level of production, and also
allow lead firms control over those terms. Notably, even supply terms that
are economically consistent with acceptable conditions may give rise to
responsibility for poor conditions in the absence of terms and monitoring
systems that effectively ban those conditions, where the brand is aware that
formally benign terms are associated with poor conditions.
There may be still deeper grounds for responsibility in the context of
production liability that buttress the case for giving responsibility a legal
form.101 Although the account of bare responsibility above does not rely on
98. See CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN, AND
STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS 32 (2011).
99. See, e.g., Philip Pettit, Responsibility Incorporated, 117 ETHICS 171, 177–92 (2007);
Manuel Velasquez, Debunking Corporate Moral Responsibility, 13 BUS. ETHICS Q. 531, 534–
38 (2003).
100. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (2019) (providing that owners are not liable for
debts of corporation).
101. For other theories of corporate responsibility in this context, see Guy Davidov,
Indirect Employment: Should Lead Companies Be Liable?, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 5,
16 (2015), which asserts that democratic deficits and dependency justify the application of
labor law. Davidov canvasses a range of possible grounds for imposing responsibility,
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a theory of deliberate wrongdoing or unjust enrichment, those elements may
point to starker responsibility for some lead firms—something approaching
actual culpability. Lead firms are alleged not only to be aware of dangers
that they can prevent but to choose the contractor model precisely in order to
avail themselves of the economic advantages of dangerous working
conditions.102 Knowing that they cannot themselves successfully evade
enforcement of labor standards, lead firms may choose to externalize
production at sites that are less susceptible to regulatory oversight. Lead
firms thus obtain a regulatory discount without formally running afoul of any
regulatory obligations. Layered on the minimal conditions of responsibility
based on foresight and control, this narrative of deliberate regulatory
avoidance suggests lead firms are potentially not only responsible, but also
blameworthy.
The above argument for culpability depends on establishing intentions that
cannot be generalized across lead firms. At the same time, outcome
responsibility standing alone is too generic to motivate a legal regime of
accountability because it sweeps up so many actors without differentiating
among them. Consumers often know that they are purchasing goods that
likely have been produced under wrongful conditions.103 If consumers did
not purchase those goods, there would be marginally less demand for their
production. Carriers know that the goods they transport were produced under
wrongful conditions and that the incentive to produce them would cease
should distribution costs dramatically escalate. Media outlets that advertise
goods facilitate their sale—the outcome on which their production is
predicated. No one is proposing that all these actors be held legally liable for
unjust working conditions.
Indeed, it is apparent that we cannot be held legally responsible for every
outcome for which we are responsible. There are too many people
responsible for any given outcome, and we have liberty and relational
interests in being able to harm each other in many ways. Public policy
considerations similarly cut against attempting to hold corporations liable for
all the harms for which they are responsible—at least when deploying a thin
notion of responsibility, like outcome responsibility. Sometimes there is
disagreement about the boundaries of their appropriate legal responsibility,
as in the case of environmental and employment losses. For the most part,
including the ideas that a lead company can cause contractor infringement, have the power to
prevent infringement, can spread loss among many consumers, benefit from infringement, and
assume responsibility through either representations or by virtue of citizenship to those
working within its community. Id. at 18–32.
102. See Leo L. Lam, Comment, Designer Duty: Extending Liability to Manufacturers for
Violations of Labor Standards in Garment Industry Sweatshops, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 623, 631
(1992) (“Avoiding responsibility for the conditions under which the garment worker labors is
perhaps the foremost reason for the development of the contracting system.”); see also Glynn,
supra note 29, at 209.
103. See generally LYN K L TJON SOEI LEN, MINIMUM CONTRACT JUSTICE: A CAPABILITIES
PERSPECTIVE ON SWEATSHOPS AND CONSUMER CONTRACTS (2017) (arguing that consumer
contracts for the purchase of goods manufactured in overseas sweatshops may be
unenforceable).
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however, our political discourse demands more than bare outcome
responsibility before imposing legal liability. For example, even when
corporations are regularly criticized for failing to promote a worthy social
end (e.g., by failing to extend health insurance to same-sex couples before
same-sex marriage was legally recognized), there is no suggestion that their
policies should result in legal liability. Production liability needs a further
moral foothold. It needs to be able to distinguish among the myriad social
actors responsible for dangerous supplier working conditions and explain
why lead firms are more responsible than other participants in global
economic institutions.
B. Complicity in the Wrongs of Suppliers
The particular form of responsibility that lead firms bear is complicity.
Although they do not directly perpetrate any wrongs against the workers who
manufacture their goods, their actions enable suppliers’ wrongs in such a way
as to render lead firms complicit. We may systematically fail to call out
complicity because it falls in a blind spot in our moral reasoning, or what
Christopher Kutz calls a “relational and causal solipsism.”104 We focus on
direct individual responsibility, and it might be that our public discourse
simply does not have the wherewithal to sustain appropriate levels of public
censure for all types of wrongdoing.105 But “[t]he most important and farreaching harms and wrongs of contemporary life are the products of
collective actions, mediated by social and institutional structures.”106 If we
limit censure to individual production of harm, we will fail to hold anyone
accountable for many pervasive wrongs.
Inducing and even consenting to the production of harm by others are
among the recognized ways in which we can be complicit in wrongdoing.107
Knowing contribution to another’s wrongdoing is all that is required108—
complicity does not require full-fledged partnership or identification with the
wrongdoer. Thus, the charge of complicity against lead firms does not imply
that lead firms are working with suppliers to subject workers to dangerous
working conditions. It is enough that lead firms are on notice that their
contracts with suppliers are the occasion for which these workers are subject
to oppressive conditions.
Complicity amounts to a kind of infection of responsibility. In this case,
suppliers commit the direct wrong of employing workers dangerously, and
their wrongdoing infects lead firms by way of their contracts for the purchase
of goods those workers produce. The conditions of contagion are those we
104. CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 5 (2000).
105. Id. at 5–6 (suggesting individual and collective responsibility may be substitutes for
each other due to a crowding-out effect in blaming practices).
106. Id. at 113.
107. See Gregory Mellema, Collective Responsibility and Qualifying Actions, 30 MIDWEST
STUD. PHIL. 168, 170–72 (2006) (identifying six varieties of complicity); see also KUTZ, supra
note 104, at 122, 138.
108. CHIARA LEPORA & ROBERT E. GOODIN, ON COMPLICITY AND COMPROMISE 7, 80–83
(2013).
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associate with shared, rather than joint, intention. Michael Bratman
describes shared intentions as ones that separate persons have and act in
accordance with. Their actions do not have to be identical but should be
responsive to “meshing subplans.”109 Margaret Gilbert, by contrast, has a
“plural subject account” in which members of a group are “jointly committed
to intending as a body to do A.”110 Similarly, J. David Velleman argues that
a unified moral subject is necessary to establish collective responsibility and
that such a plural subject involves “two or more subjects who combine in
such a way as to constitute one subject.”111 Bratman’s thinner account of
cooperation captures the moral relationship between suppliers and lead firms
better than a plural-subject account. Lead firms do not join with suppliers in
a common enterprise of production. They remain arm’s-length actors,
pursuing separate and, to some extent, rival economic interests. However,
their separate plans intersect in their supply contracts, which reflect a
common interest in inattention to workers’ interests.
The most problematic supply contracts do not directly address working
conditions at all. This might appear to foreclose application of Bratman’s
account of shared intentions, if the contracts’ silence on working conditions
is read as the absence of any objective intent with respect to working
conditions. We might point to evidence that lead firms specifically intend
working conditions to be so poor in order to enable the lowest consumer
prices. But evidence of specific intention is uneven and, therefore, a poor
basis for a general principle of liability, in the same way that we rejected ad
hoc cases of culpability among lead firms as inadequate grounding for
production liability.
We can look instead to Larry May’s alternative account of group
intentions, which provides a useful supplement to Bratman’s model. May
suggests that “pre-reflective” group intentions are ones that “are not yet
reflected upon by each of the members of . . . [the] group.”112 They are not
the product of individual consciousness, but “arise out of the relations and
structures of the group.”113 In this context, we might say that lead firms and
suppliers share a pre-reflective intent to subject workers to dangerous
conditions even absent any specific intention to do so; their intent with
respect to workers follows from the economic structure in which they jointly
participate.
At least some of the discomfort with lead firms’ conduct probably does lie
not in their specific contracting policies, but in their role in an unjust global
economic order or their participation in unjust local labor markets. These
economic structures implicate others as well. But complicity is a matter of

109. MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, FACES OF INTENTION: SELECTED ESSAYS ON INTENTION AND
AGENCY 121 (1999).
110. MARGARET GILBERT, SOCIALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 22 (2000).
111. J. David Velleman, How to Share an Intention, 57 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES.
29, 30 (1997).
112. LARRY MAY, THE MORALITY OF GROUPS 62 (1987).
113. Id. at 61–65.
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degree.114 Even if the supply chain were to be regarded as a group, members
do not share equal fault because they contribute differently to the harm at
issue.115 In fact, we might attempt to set up a sliding scale of complicity
from copartners to noncausal participation or unknowing contribution.116 On
such a scale, lead firms would rank well below suppliers but still well ahead
of ordinary consumers.
Other participants in the supply chain, including consumers, may be
morally tainted by wrongs of suppliers because moral taint may attach to
membership in even a thinly constituted group that commits a wrong.117 But
even absent any affirmative intent with respect to suppliers’ workers, lead
firms take affirmative steps that are causally linked to the workers’ harm.
Most important, they set the timetable for production and the prices paid for
the goods.118 Consumers do not have direct influence over these driving
factors. Consumers also have less knowledge of the conditions of
production; in most cases, they do not know where production takes place or
which supplier firm is involved. Their relative ignorance is accompanied by
relative uncertainty as to whether their decision to buy will actually result in
worse conditions for any worker or group of workers. Although all
participants in the supply chain may share pre-reflexive intentions with
respect to its functioning, and although the result may be that we are all thinly
responsible for wrongful conditions of production, some agents of our
collective economy are more obligated than others to alleviate harm as a
result of their position in the causal chain.119
The phenomenology of agency gives priority to near, direct, and
unmediated effects. When “an outcome is the joint result of the actions of a
number of people, including ourselves, we tend to see our own agency as
implicated to a much lesser extent than we do when we take an effect to have
resulted solely from our own actions.”120 Complicity, like responsibility, is
not exclusive to lead firms. But by identifying the particular kind of
responsibility that lead firms bear, we can see how their responsibility is more
severe than the responsibility of other actors that might also be infected with
responsibility for suppliers’ wrongdoing.

114.
115.
116.
117.

See LEPORA & GOODIN, supra note 108, at 80–83.
See Joel Feinberg, Collective Responsibility, 65 J. PHIL. 674, 685 (1968).
LEPORA & GOODIN, supra note 108, at 8, 97–129.
See Juha Räikkä, On Disassociating Oneself from Collective Responsibility, 23 SOC.
THEORY & PRAC. 93, 104 (1997).
118. Corporate demands on suppliers are probably “potentially essential”—not “definitely
essential” or “inessential” according to the framework of Lepora and Goodin. See LEPORA &
GOODIN, supra note 108, at 63.
119. Tracy Isaacs, Collective Responsibility and Collective Obligation, 38 MIDWEST STUD.
PHIL. 40, 41 (2014).
120. Samuel Scheffler, Individual Responsibility in a Global Age, 12 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y
FOUND. 219 (1995), reprinted in BOUNDARIES AND ALLEGIANCES: PROBLEMS OF JUSTICE AND
RESPONSIBILITY IN LIBERAL THOUGHT 32, 39 (2001).
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C. Complicity as Public Wrongdoing
Thus far, I have argued that lead firms are “outcome responsible” for
dangerous working conditions. More specifically, they are complicit in the
wrongdoing of suppliers. Just as complicity is one among many variants of
responsibility, complicity itself is of varied character. This Part argues that
the complicity of lead firms amounts to public wrongdoing, and so their
responsibility is of a public sort. The public character of their complicity has
two main features: (1) it is a failure of social responsibility rather than direct
responsibility to particular private persons, and (2) it is more forward-looking
than backward-looking, in that it justifies a special role in rectifying unjust
social conditions rather than in compensating losses that have already been
incurred.
Absent specific circumstances that we cannot generalize across the
industry—that is, direct control over production methods or compensation—
lead firms are not directly responsible to the employees of suppliers. They
are responsible for the conditions under which those employees work, in the
sense of outcome responsibility, and they are complicit in the wrong to which
those working conditions amount. Although there is a high degree of
certainty that low prices and tight schedules will result in poor working
conditions, there is also a high degree of uncertainty that any particular
person will be wronged by working under those conditions. This is not just
because the employees of suppliers are usually unknown to lead firms and
turnover in the workforce is high; the very number of employees that a
supplier hires depends on the existence and terms of the supply contract as
well. More exacting terms in supply contracts that demand safe working
conditions are likely to result in lower levels of employment and probably
lower pay. It is quite likely that many individual workers, given their
oppressive choice set, prefer unsafe working conditions to safe working
conditions, where the latter are bundled with a higher risk of unemployment
and lower pay. It is therefore not clear that a supply contract that creates an
unsafe job is a wrong to the particular worker who occupies that position.
The duty to produce goods under safe working conditions is not best
conceived as a duty to particular workers, but as a duty to support just social
institutions.121 Even though individual workers may prefer unsafe working
conditions, it is a collective aim to abolish dangerous working conditions
because we think it will benefit the worst-off workers in the long run. The
duty to further that aim effectively runs to society as a whole rather than to
particular workers. Lead firms do not wrong individual workers, but their
supply contracts render them complicit in the subversion of just employment
practices.122

121. The natural duty to support just institutions is associated with the political theory of
John Rawls. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 114–16 (1971).
122. Remedial responsibilities can flow from “the interests we all share in sustaining the
major social institutions.” Derrick Darby & Nyla R. Branscombe, Beyond the Sins of the
Fathers: Responsibility for Inequality, 38 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 121, 133 (2014).
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The second respect in which we should regard the complicity of lead firms
as a matter of public responsibility follows from the first. The duty to support
just social institutions is a mostly forward-looking duty.123 On particular
facts, we can show that some actions violate such a duty even absent a related
legal obligation. But most of the time we invoke the duty to support just
social institutions as a justification for imposing more specific legal duties
on private actors. Although private actors may already have responsibility
for a set of outcomes (as lead firms bear responsibility for the conditions
under which their goods are produced), they do not have a specific duty to
avoid those outcomes until it is recognized publicly. We could say that, as
yet, the duty of lead firms to contract with suppliers on terms that rule out
dangerous work is subject only to an inchoate public duty to avoid creating
dangerous working conditions. We are still waiting for clear public
recognition of such a duty. Any conclusion that lead firms are complicit in
wrongful employment practices, then, does not by itself generate a legal duty
or legal entitlement. Rather, it justifies the imposition of such legal liability.
And because the underlying responsibility is public, the appropriate form that
liability should take is regulatory.124 Although the merits of different forms
of production liability will be considered at greater length in Part IV, the
moral analysis here points toward public liability as the default form for
recognizing complicity in the manner of a public wrong.
It is not enough to justify production liability to show that corporations are
morally responsible for the poor working conditions of their suppliers or even
that they are more complicit than other participants in surrounding economic
institutions. Given the material consequences of production liability, any
affirmative argument for recognizing it has to consider its expected economic
impact.
In the next Part, this Article argues that not only is the moral predicate of
legal responsibility fulfilled, such liability is also commendable on
instrumental grounds. Once we overcome intuitions about the boundaries of
responsibility, as we did in the context of manufacturer responsibility for
consumer injuries, we can adapt legal liability to effectively respond to
contemporary production and distribution systems in much the way that
products liability did.

123. Political responsibility is more forward-looking than a liability model of
responsibility. See Iris Marion Young, Responsibility and Global Labor Justice, in
RESPONSIBILITY IN CONTEXT: PERSPECTIVES 53, 65–66 (Gorana Ognjenovic ed., 2010).
Young develops the idea of political responsibility that originates with Hannah Arendt. See
generally Hannah Arendt, Collective Responsibility, in AMOR MUNDI: EXPLORATIONS IN THE
FAITH AND THOUGHT OF HANNAH ARENDT 43 (James W. Bernauer ed., 1987). People are
politically responsible for economic structures that are managed primarily through politics.
See generally id. While action generates individual responsibility in the ordinary case,
inaction generates typical political responsibility. See generally id.
124. Cf. KUTZ, supra note 104, at 138 (tying the appropriate form of accountability to an
individual’s particular relation to wrongdoing).
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III. OPTIMAL COST ASSIGNMENT
The question of whether production liability is efficient may be still more
difficult than its parallel in products liability. In the case of product defects
that injure consumers, it is clear that consumers are within the set of subjects
whose welfare the state aims to improve.125 Moreover, consumer interests
are, to a substantial extent, internalized by firms that wish to keep and win
customers.126 By contrast, most of the workers at lead firms’ suppliers are
located overseas. Arguably, their welfare losses do not have the same
standing in social welfare calculations that underlie U.S. policy. That
problem makes the questions around “fair” compensation especially difficult.
However, one of the motivations behind restricting the question considered
here to workplace safety is that we can presume that there is a minimum
threshold level of workplace safety below which it is impermissible to allow
work to take place—irrespective of the local labor market, other contract
terms, knowing consent by workers, developmental stage of the economy,
and local law. This is a level of danger that no one would be prepared to
accept under fair background conditions or, at least, one at which no U.S.
national is permitted to conduct business, even outside the United States.
Obviously, determining exactly what the workplace standards should be in
this context is difficult and mired in the details of specific industries. Even
if international law supplies the norm that certain working conditions are
intolerable, it does not supply the minimum standard that the United States
should deploy in regulating the conditions under which goods sold here must
be produced. The standard imposed by the United States with respect to
overseas work sites should avoid violating the right of local communities to
decide their own local standards. A sufficiently minimum standard would
probably overlap substantially with local standards on the books (even if they
are poorly enforced) and might be negotiated by way of trade agreements so
that host governments can participate in setting the standard. But, ultimately,
the standard in question is the standard below which we cannot abide our
national corporations conducting business. Politics must supply that
standard.
The challenge here is different. We must identify the form of the liability
regime that would best raise workplace safety to such a minimum bar,
whatever that might be. Where dangerous working conditions are below the
fixed threshold, not only the injuries that materialize but also the (moral and
psychological) situation of working in such a hazardous environment can be
regarded as an externality of the garment enterprise. The policy aim should
125. In fact, the dominant norm in the contracts literature is consumer sovereignty, or that
consumer preferences on risk allocation should prevail. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Proposals
for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 355 (1988). There
is no parallel norm of worker sovereignty in the context of production.
126. Cf. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability,
123 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1490 (2010) (“There is a crucial difference between situations in
which strangers are harmed and those in which customers are harmed . . . if its customers are
injured, it would expect to suffer . . . losses . . . . [M]arket forces will not induce firms to
increase safety if those at risk are strangers.”).
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be to deter such dangerous working conditions absolutely, though
realistically some factories are likely to operate below the minimum
threshold at any given time. We might simultaneously and separately
undertake to reduce the rate of workplace injury more generally in a similar
way to how we aim to reduce the rate of consumer injury. The problem of
pricing those injuries across disparate markets, however, is comparable to the
problems associated with determining “fair” wages.
There are several actors in a position to prevent dangerous working
conditions at any given factory: the workers, the supplier-contractors, and
the lead firms with substantial bargaining power vis-à-vis suppliercontractors. In principle, the state could impose costs, such as fines, on any
of these actors when they are implicated in unsafe working conditions.
Outside of forced-labor situations, workers have some control over the
phenomenon of dangerous work. They could, in principle, decline to accept
egregious working conditions. After all, what counts as egregious is set in
large part by reference to what we think a worker would refuse.
Unfortunately, the standard is not set by reference to what workers will
actually accept but what we speculate that they would knowingly and freely
accept under fair background conditions, and those qualifications are
necessary precisely because the circumstances under which many workers
choose to accept employment at dangerous workplaces do not meet those
stipulations. In some cases, workers are unaware of the dangerous nature of
their workplace because safety deficiencies are not apparent. For example,
they may be unaware of structural or electrical problems in the building, or
they may be ignorant to the risks created by poorly maintained and outdated
manufacturing equipment. One of the most common workplace hazards is
occupational asthma, a condition that may worsen over time as workers are
exposed to invisible dust, vapors, gases, or fumes in their workplaces.127
In other cases, workers may become aware of the dangerous nature of their
working conditions only upon commencing employment, after they have
already fallen into a cycle of dependence on (or debt to) a particular employer
that makes exit especially costly. Finally, many workers have such a poor
choice set to begin with that working under dangerous conditions is not their
worst option. In these cases, restricting their employment options will leave
them worse off in the near term (from at least one conception of welfare)
since they are prepared to accept terms that are no longer available to them.
Because this last set of cases probably describes many workers, we cannot
properly characterize regulation of dangerous working conditions as the
enforcement of free-standing individual entitlements. Rather, any individual
entitlement to workplace safety is best regarded as derivative from a social
interest in imposing general standards. The social interest might ultimately
operate to the benefit of most workers, but its pursuit will almost certainly
come at the expense of some subgroup of workers. Whether by virtue of
collective action problems or actual self-interest, we cannot expect workers
127. Ariela Migdal, Note, RCRA in the Workplace: Using Environmental Law to Combat
Dangerous Conditions in Sweatshops, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1843, 1847–48 (2000).
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to simply refrain from accepting working conditions that a national political
community, to which they may or may not belong, might find unacceptable.
To enforce a rule against dangerous working conditions by attempting to alter
worker behavior, we would have to either directly fine workers or otherwise
penalize them, for example, by refusing to enforce the payment of
compensation they are due or by rendering them ineligible for future work.
Since workplace regulations are at least nominally intended to improve the
situation of workers, it would be ironic in the least to penalize workers in any
direct way. Moreover, most available (and wholly unattractive) means
require cooperation by the direct employer: the supplier. For the reasons to
be discussed, we cannot expect their cooperation.
The next and most obvious set of actors that could be targeted by a legal
regime are the supplier-contractors themselves. Recall that many suppliers
are overseas, so, barring a violation of the laws of nations, they are outside
the reach of U.S. law, whether via a private right of action or an agency
directive.128 Contractors in the United States are usually judgment-proof,
and bankruptcy protects them from any prolonged debt burden.129 When
they do pay out fines, the additional cost pressures result in further reduction
of employee compensation.130 But contractors do not usually pay. They are
highly mobile with limited capital and therefore easily evade enforcement
authorities, for example, by closing and reopening under new names.131 The
result is that neither domestic nor overseas suppliers are a viable point of
enforcement because fines and civil judgments cannot be collected. This
conclusion is unsurprising: the fact that the present system of labor
enforcement depends entirely on managing the behavior of suppliers is the
reason that the present regime is wholly unsatisfactory to most observers.
Lead firms are an alternative, and, indeed, they can efficiently prevent
dangerous working conditions at suppliers. First, lead firms are in the best
position to actually take steps that would improve workplace safety because
they have an overview of industry practice and available technology. They
bear relatively low information costs in coming up with specific steps that
each supplier must take. Some of the relevant information will be local to
specific factory sites. But because lead firms have the most resources of any
actor in the supply chain, they may be in a better position to acquire even
local information than the supplier.
This advantage to assigning
responsibility to lead firms somewhat mimics the argument, in the context of
products liability, that manufacturers are in the best position to prevent injury

128. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
129. See Lung, supra note 10, at 305.
130. See Hayashi, supra note 4, at 204–05.
131. See Naomi Jiyoung Bang, Unmasking the Charade of the Global Supply Contract: A
Novel Theory of Corporate Liability in Human Trafficking and Forced Labor Cases, 35 HOUS.
J. INT’L L. 255, 271 (2013).
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because they are the ones in a position to identify measures that can be taken
to improve design or reduce the error rate in manufacturing.132
Additional arguments for the assignment of costs to lead firms apply in the
context of production liability. Many observers suggest that lead firms
presently limit the possibility of decent working conditions by virtue of the
low prices they pay suppliers.133 Lead firms set the prices that they pay
suppliers by calculating how long it will take to produce garments under ideal
conditions; but those conditions do not approximate the conditions under
which the goods are actually produced by their undercapitalized suppliers,
who tend to employ low-skilled workers and use inferior machinery.134 The
result is that the prices that lead firms pay are barely enough to cover supplier
costs, even where supplier costs are artificially depressed by noncompliance
with labor codes. Were suppliers to provide safe workplaces, their contracts
with lead firms would be losing contracts. Thus, lead firms are at least in a
position to make it possible to improve workplace safety by paying higher
prices. Firms that do not wish to undertake reform of their suppliers’
practices can search out suppliers that already comply with minimum
workplace-safety standards.
Lead firms could also trade off a price increase for goods in exchange for
increased control over suppliers’ workplaces, as well as increased monitoring
rights. They could do so in a way that leaves unaltered the suppliers’
expected gains from trade, entirely at their own expense. Of course, they are
unlikely to simply absorb either the costs of actually improving workplace
conditions or paying off regulatory fines upon failure. In part, we can expect
them to attempt to recoup costs through indemnification clauses with
suppliers135 and possibly through the purchase of insurance. But we can also
expect lead firms to pass on their increased costs to consumers.
The fact that lead firms are in a position to pass increased costs associated
with improved working conditions on to consumers is actually one of the
strongest arguments in favor of assigning costs to them.136 After all, there
may be intermediaries between lead firms and suppliers who can also be
132. See Richard W. Wright, The Principles of Product Liability, 26 REV. LITIG. 1067,
1115 (2007) (“Manufacturers generally have much better information than plaintiffs about the
‘state of the art’ with respect to possible technology and product risks.”).
133. Lead firms set retail prices and supplier prices, and they keep approximately half of
the retail price. Elmore, supra note 60, at 400. Garment employee compensation amounts to
only 6 percent of retail prices. Id. at 401.
134. Hayashi, supra note 4, at 203 (explaining that manufacturers calculate contract prices
on the basis of the time it takes a sample maker to produce the garment under “accepted
industry conditions” that depart significantly from the conditions under which garments are in
fact produced).
135. Glynn, supra note 29, at 205 (arguing for enterprise liability with respect to unpaid
wages and suggesting that companies will bargain for indemnification).
136. This Article assumes that higher labor costs will be passed on and that this will in fact
achieve a distributive effect—because the aim is not distribution from buyers to sellers but
from sellers (of labor) to buyers of products at various points along the supply chain, including,
but not limited to, consumers. See generally Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal
Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361
(1991).

2530

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

described as complicit but who cannot raise retail prices. One aim of a
regime of production liability should be to shift costs to the parties best
positioned to distribute costs widely instead of allowing them to fall
arbitrarily and in concentrated form on unwitting workers—just as products
liability shifts costs from a handful of unwitting consumers to
manufacturers.137 Perhaps even more clearly than in the context of products
liability, lead firms are, by virtue of their market position, in the best position
to reflect the price of workplace safety in the price of goods such that all users
of the goods bear their true costs.138
The other means by which states sometimes aim to impose costs on
consumers are undesirable and unworkable. The state criminalizes the
possession of some goods, but crimination would exaggerate the
responsibility of consumers in this case and would involve heavy-handed
state machinery that has proven costly and ineffective in smaller markets.
The state could also subject a disfavored product to a special consumer tax
but, by imposing costs on all goods irrespective of the conditions under which
they were produced, such a tax would fail to capture (or track) responsibility
altogether. It would be impracticable for the state to identify goods produced
under noncompliant conditions and subject only those goods to a tax at the
point of sale. The most feasible way to make consumers pay for humane
working conditions is to impose liability on lead firms in the first instance.
Finally, lead firms are the cheapest point of legal enforcement.
Reputational interests would reinforce the deterrent effect of any legal rule.
Because lead firms are the fewest in number and have long corporate lives
and substantial assets, the ordinary mechanisms for enforcing legal
judgments will be effective. Perhaps equally important, lead firms interact
with the legal system at many points and cannot afford to operate in its
shadows. They can be expected to undertake compliance with any legal rule
to which they are subject.
If the previous Part established that production liability is morally
defensible, this Part intended to establish that it is economically
commendable. But, of course, whether production liability would have
perverse effects on the incentives of retailers, suppliers, export countries, or
even foreign employees will depend on the particular legal form it takes,
which leads to the issues addressed in the next Part, namely, the mechanism
of enforcement and the standard of liability.

137. Products liability history was driven in early part by ideas of internalization and risk
distribution. George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 483 (1985).
138. Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE
L.J. 499, 505 (1961) (“[Resource-allocation] theory requires that among the several parties
engaged in an enterprise the loss should be placed on the party which is most likely to cause
the burden to be reflected in the price of whatever the enterprise sells.”).
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IV. AGENCY ENFORCEMENT
This Part considers several legal mechanisms by which production liability
might be implemented. We could recognize a right of action in various
stakeholders, either under existing common-law doctrines or by way of a new
statute. We could further promote transnational private regulation or
facilitate agreements among retailers to abide by voluntary standards (which
would be mandatory for their suppliers). Or we could impose new statutory
duties for corporations. Although politically difficult to attain, this Article
argues that on-point legislation paired with even a limited administrative
remedy is the best and, perhaps, the necessary route to production liability.
While we can expect public underenforcement of any statutory provision,
such a course could give rise to two additional indirect enforcement
mechanisms. First, shareholders of corporations that knowingly violate
statutory obligations can bring derivative suits. Second, suppliers can seek
to avoid terms in supply agreements where those agreements effectuate a
violation of the statute. Before considering the advantages of an affirmative
statutory approach, this Part addresses the deficiencies in each of the
alternative methods of enacting production liability.
A. Private Rights of Action by Employees
The most obvious way to recognize production liability, and the form most
parallel to products liability, would be to make retailers liable to individual
employees whose working conditions fail to meet a given standard. One
might attempt to achieve this by reforming or expanding existing doctrines
such as joint employer liability, vicarious liability, or the doctrine of
nondelegable duties; or courts could adopt a more sweeping new theory of
private liability along the lines of products liability. Although there is much
to be said for direct liability to workers, there are good reasons not to go this
route.
First, private recourse directly against lead firms will distort labor markets.
Employees will prefer to work for factories producing goods for recognizable
brands. Although lesser-known lead firms will face the same costs, they
likely will face higher costs as the labor costs of branded firms fall in
response to higher worker demands for those workplaces, which will be
perceived to provide more credible assurances.
Second, relying on private claims will distort the kinds of safety measures
in which lead firms invest. Individuals are most likely to sue for immediate,
substantial injuries. But many of the most important workplace-safety
regulations are intended to promote worker safety in ways that do not
decrease actionable claims. For example, general improvements in the
hygiene or ventilation of a workplace may not prevent specific accidents, but
such improvements produce marginally superior health outcomes for all
workers. Using safer chemicals may decrease cancer rates. But workers are
unlikely to successfully sue for general lack of hygiene, poor ventilation, or
the use of carcinogens in a workplace because it is difficult to prove causation
of specific injuries and because many illnesses are too minor to justify

2532

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

litigation. Such conditions may go unaddressed because companies will
primarily invest in preventing injuries that are likely to result in private suits
while neglecting to protect against minor but pervasive health risks.
Finally, given existing legal frameworks, any direct right of action is likely
to be far more accessible to domestic workers than overseas workers. The
effect will exacerbate the price differential between domestic and overseas
labor to the long-term detriment of the domestic garment industry. The
overall welfare of garment workers will not be improved. Of course, the
weight to be assigned to this consideration depends on the precise normative
theory that underpins our commitment to safe workplaces.
B. Private Rights of Action by Consumers
Lead firms may become indirectly liable for supplier working conditions
where consumers are entitled to sue for fraud or misrepresentation.139 This
requires an initial representation by lead firms that their goods are produced
under acceptable conditions. Many companies already feel pressure to issue
such statements.140 If courts recognized those representations as material
and consumers are presumed to rely on them, companies could face
substantial liability to consumers as a class. A statutory regime might bolster
common-law claims either by requiring certification for the representation or
creating a presumption of materiality and reliance. A quite different tack
could enable consumers to successfully claim against lead firms for supplier
working conditions under a theory that extends public nuisance law; lead
firms would be alleged to be responsible for creating impermissible
conditions. Such a theory would require some legislative action to establish
that the conditions created by lead firms are properly characterized as
illegal.141
Separate from the practical obstacles, there is something peculiar, in
principle, about improving overseas working conditions by creating a private
right of action for domestic consumers. Although this Article concludes that
direct responsibility to suppliers’ workers is ill-conceived, such liability at
least correctly identifies as potential plaintiffs that group whose welfare is at
issue. Consumer practices suggest that most consumers do not in fact regard
the conditions under which goods are produced as highly material to their
individual consumption choices. There is no good way for courts to
distinguish between those consumers who do care and those who do not.
Moreover, since even concerned consumers do not suffer material harm, they
normally will be entitled only to rescission. Any further damages would be
a windfall for just that privileged group whose interest in low prices competes
with workers’ interest in decent working conditions.

139. As discussed in Part I, some observers argue that there is an existing basis for such
liability. See supra Part I.
140. See, e.g., Backer, supra note 34, at 836.
141. See generally Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (rejecting the
plaintiff states’ attempt to hold corporations responsible for global warming).
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C. Private Regulation
Perhaps the easiest way to recognize production liability is through
voluntary agreements among brands. Firms within an industry sometimes
agree to abide by set standards and assume responsibility for contracting with
suppliers on terms that ensure compliance. Some company alliances work
with nongovernmental or international organizations to help enforce
voluntary agreements. Others adopt no enforcement plan.
Were these agreements to be fostered and then enforced, it would be the
most politically feasible means to establish liability. Because all signatories
would have an interest in enforcement against other signatories, and because
the effect that improving supplier working conditions would have on market
share is minimal with coordinated action, lead firms actually have an interest
in cooperating in the adoption of industry standards.
But voluntary agreement among lead firms is the wrong mechanism by
which to set their obligations to third parties. Contract as an institution is
designed to maximize the joint interests of parties to an agreement. There is
no obligation or incentive to give any weight to third parties. Firms may
agree to abide by voluntary standards because they perceive the threat of
regulation or otherwise see market constraints from the consumer side.
However, there is little reason to expect that firms will give the interests of
an economically weak group due weight given the ineffectiveness of
regulatory threats over time and mass consumer indifference.142 Nor can we
have confidence that the groups that would attempt to secure and negotiate
private regulatory agreements would appropriately represent the range of
interests at stake; most obviously, we can expect the interests of domestic
and international workers to diverge. The private regulations that firms come
up with unilaterally or agree to under pressure may be better than nothing
and can be encouraged as an intermediate step toward regulation. Alongside
public regulation, private contract can be the basis for the kind of monitoring,
feedback, and advocacy that must feed into any administrative enforcement
scheme. But serious self-enforcement standing alone is a costly proposition
that companies will not embrace any more than necessary.143 Indeed, selfenforcement to date is only occasionally effective and is, more often, plagued
by incomplete or inaccurate reporting.144 Companies have been prepared to
“partner” with industry watch groups but have not taken obvious steps to

142. See Debra Cohen Maryanov, Sweatshop Liability: Corporate Codes of Conduct and
the Governance of Labor Standards in the International Supply Chain, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 397, 403 (2010) (stating that codes of conduct are intended to ward off more restrictive
regulation). The enforcement of codes is limited. Id. at 409.
143. For example, Gap spent $10,000 annually on inspections at a single plant in El
Salvador and estimated it would cost 4.5 percent of its annual total profits of $877 million in
2000 to replicate this model throughout its supply chain. Grieser, supra note 62, at 312.
144. Auditors’ connections to the firms they audit make observers skeptical of their
reporting. See Paul David Harpur, New Governance and the Role of Public and Private
Monitoring of Labor Conditions: Sweatshops and China Social Compliance for Textile and
Apparel Industry, 38 RUTGERS L. REC. 49, 58 (2011).
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redress poor working conditions, such as making specific conditions
regarding worker compensation or altering the way they pay suppliers.145
In a few notable cases, worker groups backed by considerable external
expertise and resources have managed to implement rigorous compliance
programs that have radically improved working conditions in industries that
were previously plagued with the worst abuses.146 But we can have no
reasonable expectation that the resources that these movements have required
will materialize in every industry or supply chain in which regulation would
be appropriate.
Besides the direct costs of subjecting itself to a strict enforcement
regime—the costs of both monitoring and compliance—a company
contemplating participation in an “industry-wide” effort faces the probability
that at least some firms will choose not to participate. Among the most highprofile industry accords has been the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in
Bangladesh, adopted in the aftermath of a factory collapse in Bangladesh that
killed more than 1000 workers.147 Although most worker deaths related to
workplace safety are more difficult to trace causally and not en masse, the
stark horror of the 2013 factory collapse prompted particular outrage. NGOs
pushed for action and the resulting Accord’s inspection standards drew from
the Bangladesh National Building Code,148 but they were modified based on
multiparty discussions facilitated by the International Labour Organization
(ILO). Nevertheless, even in this salient case, numerous brands linked to the
factory, including J. C. Penney, Wal-Mart, H&M, and The Children’s Place,
did not sign the accord.149 Only twelve U.S. companies have signed thus
far.150 The organization that monitored most North American firms, the
Alliance for Bangladesh Workplace Safety, has completed its five-year
term.151

145. See Dana Raigrodski, Creative Capitalism and Human Trafficking: A Business
Approach to Eliminate Forced Labor and Human Trafficking from Global Supply Chains,
8 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 71, 128–30 (2016).
146. See generally James J. Brudney, Decent Labour Standards in Corporate Supply
Chains: The Immokalee Workers Model, in TEMPORARY LABOUR MIGRATION IN THE GLOBAL
ERA: THE REGULATORY CHALLENGES 351 (Joanna Howe & Rosemary Owens eds., 2016).
147. See ACCORD ON FIRE & BUILDING SAFETY BANGL., http://bangladeshaccord.org
[https://perma.cc/TH8M-WUXX] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
148. Clare O’Connor, These Retailers Involved in Bangladesh Factory Disaster Have Yet
to Compensate Victims, FORBES (Apr. 26, 2014, 5:29 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
clareoconnor/2014/04/26/these-retailers-involved-in-bangladesh-factory-disaster-have-yetto-compensate-victims/ [https://perma.cc/6HV3-W9FE].
149. Id.; Rhonda Smith, Bangladeshi Labor Leader Stresses Concerns on Safety at WalMart Shareholders’ Meeting, 27 Lab. Relations Wk. (BNA) 24 (June 12, 2013).
150. See Accord Signatories, ACCORD ON FIRE & BUILDING SAFETY BANGL.,
https://bangladeshaccord.org/signatories [https://perma.cc/DHS7-4QVK] (last visited Apr.
10, 2019).
151. ALLIANCE FOR BANGL. WORKER SAFETY, http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org/
[https://perma.cc/K4WQ-VGTJ] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
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Self-regulation does not represent a stable solution to an international
regulatory problem in the absence of some new, distinct incentive for firms
to take into account the interests of those outside their industry group.152
D. Administrative Enforcement: Regulatory Strict Liability
A simple public regulatory requirement that imposes an affirmative duty
on companies to use suppliers with safe working conditions best embodies
production liability. Responsibility for the conditions of production at a
supplier is of a public nature: supply terms that motivate or perpetuate poor
working conditions are a problem from a systemic point of view. Dangerous
working conditions do not represent a wrong to any single class, but are part
of a market dynamic that needs to be disrupted as a matter of public justice.
Just as corporations are required to engage in or forbear a variety of activities
that are against the public interest, they should be required to contract for
goods on terms that are compatible with a just market for consumer goods.
A statute that codifies production liability would have familial precedent in
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, which similarly held corporations
liable for activities that are in substantial part overseas.153
Assuming only civil liability is at stake, some administrative branch or
agency should be assigned the right to hold corporations accountable by
imposing fines for violations of the substantive conduct requirements. The
fines should not be conceived as compensatory; their level should take into
account the rate of enforcement. Based on our experience with other laborrelated enforcement, we can expect that limited resources will be allocated
to enforcement of any new provision. Nevertheless, a substantive
requirement would be useful both for the direct deterrence achieved by
substantial fines and because a statutory duty would allow supplementary
means of enforcement that do not require government action.154 A complete
solution will involve joint use of public regulation and private litigation.155
1. Derivative Actions by Shareholders
Shareholders can bring derivative suits on behalf of corporations against
directors for failure to exercise oversight where the directors knew, or should
152. Cf. Mark T. Kawakami, Pitfalls of Over-Legalization: When the Law Crowds Out
and Spills Over, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 147, 151–56 (2017) (arguing that affording
legal status to voluntary codes will undermine intrinsic corporate motivation to abide by social
norms); Raigrodski, supra note 145, at 111 (arguing that it may be in the business interests of
lead firms to eliminate at least some of suppliers’ most egregious conduct).
153. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-2 (2012).
154. The proposal here is an inverse of what John C. P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky
describe in The Easy Case for Products Liability Law: A Response to Professors Polinsky
and Shavell, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1919 (2010). They observe, in the context of products
liability, that markets and regulatory forces would not work in the same way without a tort
liability system “feeding” them. This Article proposes a regulatory system that can feed an
ancillary system of private enforcement.
155. See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.
357, 365 (1984).
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have known, of violations of law.156 Such derivative suits usually fail
because they require that plaintiffs plead demand futility with some
precision; that is, they require that plaintiffs show the company’s board of
directors is conflicted out of the decision whether to sue.157 Plaintiffs often
try to show that directors were on notice of violations of law and chose not
to take action.158
Although plaintiffs rarely show demand futility, even in cases that likely
would not have survived dismissal, corporations often pay out substantial
settlements on their directors’ behalf. As long as settlement values bear some
relation to the probability of the suit succeeding on its merits, it helps offset
lackluster public enforcement. In the case of production liability, we can
expect demand futility claims to fare somewhat better than in typical
derivative suits because NGOs may systematically bring attention to poor
working conditions, and there may be a higher public relations cost to being
publicly associated with poor working conditions than more abstract
financial regulatory requirements. While most corporate misconduct may be
secret (outside of the corporations’ own employees), the working conditions
at firms’ suppliers are not. Because it will be easier to make directors aware,
and to subsequently document their awareness, plaintiffs may have more
success with derivative suits related to production liability than in other types
of derivative suits.
The major drawback of this mechanism of enforcement is that it is largely
under the control of a single state, Delaware. And there is little reason to
expect that Delaware courts will be eager to play a role in enforcing
production liability. Nevertheless, on the margin, the prospect of derivative
suits will increase the cost of noncompliance with a regulatory rule.
2. Unenforceability of Supply Agreements
A statutory obligation to contract with suppliers on terms that assure
tolerable working conditions for suppliers’ employees could also justify
nonenforcement of noncompliant supply agreements, or at least it might
render unenforceable those terms associated with poor working conditions
(such as time schedules) on the grounds that such agreements are against
public policy. Although it would be ironic for suppliers to benefit from a
lead firm’s failure to effectively reign in supplier practices, the doctrine that
156. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006) (“A failure
to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a
purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary
acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law, or where the fiduciary intentionally fails
to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties.”);
see also Thomas A. Uebler, Shareholder Police Power: Shareholders’ Ability to Hold
Directors Accountable for Intentional Violations of Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199, 204–13
(2008).
157. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254–55 (Del. 2000) (holding that a plaintiff must
allege with particularity facts sufficient to establish demand futility).
158. These are so-called Caremark claims. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig.,
698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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allows nonenforcement of agreements against public policy allows such
inequity in the interest of vindicating the implicated legal rule. While
suppliers cannot be expected to systematically invoke the right to void supply
agreements on these grounds, the availability of this measure should help
discipline lead firms on the margin.
E. Liability Standard
No duty-imposing statute can establish a detailed worldwide minimum
standard of workplace safety. One possibility would be to incorporate local
rules and regulations on workplace safety that are already in place. That
might make sense for working conditions at domestic suppliers.
Arguably, however, the duty on lead firms can be less rigorous than that
which applies directly to employers. That is, we might require employers to
maintain safety standards at a higher level than we require lead firms to
maintain at those same suppliers. One important advantage is that it might
be feasible, then, for the statutory duty to apply a single standard across
domestic and overseas suppliers. The requirements could not be exactly the
same, but a single legislative standard would invite agency articulation of
domestic and overseas standards that are roughly comparable.
A duty to contract with suppliers whose factories meet articulated
standards is based more in strict liability than in fault. Showing a violation
of the duty would not require showing any negligence on the part of the lead
firm whose liability is at issue, though it does imply negligence by the
supplier.159 Nor would liability turn on the occurrence of injury. Again, one
of the advantages of agency enforcement is that it can avoid the distortion of
standing and evidentiary requirements of private adjudication, which could
cause firms to attend disproportionately to easily detectable, substantial
injuries.
Like enforcement activity, we can expect the standards that agencies adopt
to be suboptimal.160 But a strict liability standard—effectively, a duty to
succeed in one’s choice of appropriate suppliers—will reduce the costs of
adjudicating individual cases, including the high error rate that follows from
opaque and highly manipulable judgments about whether a given firm’s
efforts were reasonable. Well-resourced firms can always muster evidence
in favor of weak, fault-based conduct standards, and they will largely control
evidence of their own conduct. By contrast, administrative liability that turns
on identification of a noncompliant factory requires far less factual inquiry.
Moreover, the question of liability will turn entirely on facts outside the firm
whose liability is at issue; those facts can be evidenced without
159. Cf. Cynthia Estlund, Corporate Self-Regulation and the Future of Workplace
Governance, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 617, 625 (2009) (suggesting that firms’ liability for
wrongdoing be reduced where they have maintained an adequate system of self-policing and
reporting).
160. See Michael E. Levine, Regulatory Capture, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 267 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). But see Richard A. Posner,
Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 337–39 (1974).
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documentation from the lead firm. Much like employment agencies in the
United States are assisted by unions and other worker organizations that
report workplace violations, an agency charged with enforcing production
liability may be assisted by NGOs that report workplace violations by
suppliers. The agency would only need to verify noncompliance and to
identify the lead firms supplied by the noncompliant site before it issued fines
to those firms.
The literal distance between wrongdoer and the site of wrongdoing raises
the thorny question of responsibility to which this Article has been addressed,
but it also makes it harder for a lead firm to evade liability were a regime of
legal liability to be enacted.
CONCLUSION
The lesson of products liability is that privity and fault must be relaxed as
we update our systems of liability to meet the needs of new market structures.
In the context of employment, as was earlier the case in consumer law, radical
deference to contract should give way to a more liberal, tort-like system—
albeit not one based in the common law of tort.
Of course, not everyone agrees that products liability was a success.161
And we cannot be certain about how industries will respond to production
liability. For example, production liability could result in disaggregation at
the top of the supply chain due to the advantages conferred on smaller, less
salient lead firms.162 This seems unlikely, given how central brand
recognition is to the garment industry and many other industries, but it is not
theoretically impossible. It is, though, practically impossible to persist with
the present lawless regime. Production liability is the only viable way for the
state to govern certain workplaces. We need to identify the model of
production liability most likely to effectuate the moral standards to which we
are already committed.

161. See generally, e.g., Richard Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 645 (1985) (noting that the viability of insurance depends on risk diversification,
adverse selection, and moral hazard and that direct contracts help insurers manage those
industry risks); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 126.
162. See generally Stephen F. Williams, Second Best: The Soft Underbelly of Deterrence
Theory in Tort, 106 HARV. L. REV. 932 (1993).

